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Mackus: O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.
RECENT CASES

Fall, 1978]

CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Rem Jurisdiction* Attachment of Insurance Debts
State Statutes
O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978).

T

Second Circuit, in O'Connor
v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.," upheld New York's insurance attachment
procedure which serves as a vehicle for gaining personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants in causes of action that arise outside of New York.
The court thereby determined that New York federal courts, in applying the
procedures, had not violated defendant's due process because the minimum
contacts requirement of the recent United Stated Supreme Court case,
Shaffer v. Heitner,2 had been met.
HE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

For an illustration of how New York's attachment procedures affect
the litigation and the parties involved, consider the following hypothetical
cases:
Case 1: X, a resident of New York, drove to Philadelphia to
attend a conference. While there, she was involved in a rear end automobile collision. The cars were not seriously damaged, but X was left
with severe back injuries. Y, the driver of the car behind her and the
one responsible for the accident, was a Virginia resident, passing through
Philadelphia.
Case 2: Z, a resident of Ohio, drove to Pittsburgh to have dinner there
with an acquaintance. While in Pittsburgh, he was involved in a rear
end automobile collision. Although the cars were not seriously damaged, he was left with severe back injuries. Y, the driver of the car
behind him and the one responsible for the accident, was a Virginia
resident who was passing through Pittsburgh.
In one week, Y was involved in two accidents. He was fully insured
under a policy he had purchased in Virginia from State Farm Insurance
Company, a company that also does business in New York and Ohio, among
other states across the country. The two accidents were virtually identical
in every significant detail except for the residence of the people whose cars
were hit. X would be able to bring suit successfully in her home state of
New York, but Z would not be able to maintain a similar suit in his home
1 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978).
2433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3 The facts of this case are fiction, though not legal fiction. They are very loosely based on
Hoops v. Norman, 46 App. Div. 2d 672, 359 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1974), appeal denied, 35 N.Y.2d
957, 324 N.E.2d 555, 365 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1974).
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state of Ohio. Instead, he would have to sue Y either in the state in which
the accident occurred, Pennsylvania, or in Y's state of residence, Virginia.
Harris v. Balk' was the United States Supreme Court case that created
the option for X in Case 1 to sue in her home state. Harris, a resident of
North Carolina, owed Balk, also a resident of North Carolina, $180. At the
same time, Balk owed Epstein, a resident of Maryland, $300. When Harris
was temporarily in Maryland, Epstein successfully attached Harris' debt to
Balk. Harris had argued that since he was only casually and temporarily in
Maryland and since the situs of his debt to Balk was North Carolina, a
Maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over the debt.5 The Court
reasoned, however, that the debtor (Harris) carried his debt with him and
that in any state that the creditor (Balk) could sue on the debt, so could it
be attached by a third party (Epstein), providing such attachment was permitted by local law.' Statutory attachment of a debt, in itself, became sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
More than sixty years after Harrisv. Balk was decided, the New York
Court of Appeals" in Seider v. Roth8 held that an insurance company's contractual obligation to indemnify a tortfeasor should be considered a debt
for purposes of New York's attachment statues.9 Plaintiffs had sustained
198 U.S. 215 (1905).
'Id. at 221.
6Id. at 222.
7 Recall that the court of appeals is the highest state court in New York.
8 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
9id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The legislative bases for attachment in
New York are:
N.Y. Civ. Prec. LAW § 5201 (McKinney).
(a) Debt against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money judgment may
be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is yet to become due,
certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it was incurred within
or without the state, to or from a resident or non-resident, unless it is exempt
from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause
of action which could be assigned or transferred accruing within or without the
state.
(b) Property against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money judgment
may be enforced against any property which could be assigned or transferred,
whether it consists of a present or future right or interest and whether or not it
is vested, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment.
A money judgment entered upon a joint liability of two or more persons may be
enforced against individual property of those persons summoned and joint property
of such persons with any other persons against whom the judgment is entered.
(c) Proper garnishee for particular property or debt.
1. Where property consists of a right or share in the stock of an association
or corporation, or interests or profits therein, for which a certificate of stock
or other negotiable instrument is not outstanding, the corporation, or the
president or treasurer of the association on behalf of the association, shall be
the garnishee.
2. Where property consists of a right or interest to or in a decedent's estate
4
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injuries in an automobile accident which occurred in Vermont. The defendant, a resident of Quebec, was insured by a company that did business
in New York. Chief Judge Desmond stated that "[j]urisdiction [was] properly
acquired by this attachment since the policy obligation [was] a debt owed
to the defendant by the insurer, the latter being regarded as a resident of this
State. .. ."I' New York's quasi in rem jurisdiction over the named defendant,
i.e., jurisdiction by virtue of attaching the insurance company's "debt" to the
named defendant, actually resulted in a "direct action" against the insurer.
The insurer would be required to defend in New York rather than either in
the state in which the tort occurred or in the state or country in which the
nominal defendant resided. To maintain the suit in New York, the "nominal"
defendant would be considered the tortfeasor while the insurance company
actually controlled the defense in the suit.
While the New York court made no mention of Harrisin Seider v. Roth,
it did so in the subsequent case of Simpson v. Loehmann."1 There, Chief
Judge Fuld reasoned that the attachment of the insurance debt resulted in
"no denial of due process since the presence of that debt in this State [citing
Harris]... represent[ed] sufficient of a property right [sic] in the defendant
to furnish the nexus with, and the interest in, New York to empower its courts
to exercise an in rem jurisdiction over him."" However, attachment of the
debt was not the sole reason for the court's exercise of jurisdiction; the court
or any other property or fund held or controlled by a fiduciary, the executor
or trustee under the will, administrator or other fiduciary shall be the garnishee.
3. Where property consists of an interest in a partnership, any partner other
than the judgment debtor, on behalf of the partnership, shall be the garnishee.
4. Where property or a debt is evidenced by a negotiable instrument for the
payment of money, a negotiable document of title or a certificate of stock of
an association or corporation, the instrument, document or certificate shall be
treated as property capable of delivery and the person holding it shall be
the garnishee; except that in the case of a security which is transferable in
the manner set forth in section 8-320 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the firm
or corporation which carries on its books an account in the name of the
judgment debtor in which is reflected such security, shall be the garnishee;
provided, however, that if such security has been pledged, the pledgee shall
be the garnishee.
N.Y. Civ. PRuc. LAw § 6202 (McKinney).
Any debt or property against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided
in section 5201 is subject to attachment. The proper garnishee of any such property or
debt is the person designated in section 5201; for the purpose of applying the provisions
to attachment, references to a "judgment debtor" in section 5201 . . . shall be construed to mean "defendant."
10 17 N.Y.2d

at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102, citing Matter of Riggle's
Estate, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 76-77, 181 N.E.2d 436, 437-38, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417-18 (1962).
11 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), motion for reargument denied,
21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
1221 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636. In rem jurisdiction over
property here includes quasi in rem jurisdiction over intangible property.
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realized that distinctions between "in rem" and "in personam" jurisdiction
8
were becoming hazy. In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington the United
States Supreme Court had announced that in order not to offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" in the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction, a defendant had to have certain "minimum contacts" with the
forum state.' The Simpson court did not extend the minimum contacts test
of InternationalShoe to in rem actions, but it did consider the fairness of
attaching the insurance debt as if it were applying the minimum contacts
test. The court stated:
The historical limitations on both in personam and in rem jurisdiction,
with their rigid tests, are giving way to a more realistic and reasonable
evaluation of the respective rights of plaintiffs, defendants and the State
in terms of fairness. Such an evaluation requires a practical appraisal
of the situation of the various parties rather than an emphasis upon
somewhat magical and medieval concepts of presence and power.
Viewed realistically, the insurer in a case such as the present is in full
control of the litigation; it selects the defendant's attorneys; it decides
if and when to settle; and it makes all procedural decisions in connection
with the litigation. Moreover, where the plaintiff is a resident of the
forum state and the insurer is present in and regulated by it, the State
has a substantial and continuing relation with the controversy. For
jurisdictional purposes, in assessing fairness under the due process
clause and in determining the public policy of New York, such factors
loom large. 5
The court's justification for jurisdiction indicated that it had made the
decision based on what it considered reasonable and fair in the circumstances.
In 1977, the Supreme Court extended the minimum contacts test by
holding in Shaffer v. Heitner that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe
and its progeny."' 6 For jurisdictional purposes, the Supreme Court had negated the differences among in personam, in rem,"' and quasi in rem actions,
prescribing the minimum contacts test for each. No longer would quasi in
1' 326

U.S. 310 (1945).
14 Id. at 316.

521 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (citations omitted).
2e433 U.S. at 212. Writers have been advocating the application of the International Shoe
doctrine to all types of jurisdiction for some time, arguing that any standard less than the
minimum contacts standard would be violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
New
amendment. See Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents York Goes Wild, 35 INs. CouNsEL J. 118, 119 (1968); Comment, Attachment of "Obligations" - A New Chapter in Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BuFFdo L. REv. 769, 776 (1967).
17 However, "the presence of the property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction

by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation." 433 U.S. at
207. See also id. at 217 (Powell. L., concurring).
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rem jurisdiction, as typified by a Harris v. Balk situation, be permitted where
the only contact with the forum state was the presence of intangible property
"completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action."18 The Shaffer court
explained:
[A]lthough the presence of defendant's property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and
the litigation, the presence of property alone would not support the
State's jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which
the State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in
the forum.'
The implication of this language was that where contacts among the
defendants, state, and litigation did exist, jurisdiction could lie. In Shaffer v.
Heitner, the requisite contacts were missing. There the plaintiff brought a
shareholders derivative action in Delaware against a corporation and its directors and officers for certain corporate activities in Oregon, resulting in a
successful suit against the corporation for substantial damages. The sequestration (attachment) of corporate stock in Delaware was the basis of the
plaintiff's attempt to assert jurisdiction. Defendants argued that having to
defend in Delaware would be unfair because their only contact with that
state was their stock ownership. The Supreme Court's decision that the defendants were correct is now history; the effect of that decision on courts
attempting to comprehend its impact is history in the making.
O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp. is one of the first attempts by the
federal court system to reconcile New York's insurance attachment procedures
with the Supreme Court's holding in Shaffer. In O'Connor, the United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the attachment of an insurance
debt as utilized in Seider v. Roth did not, in light of the Shaffer holding, violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 1 In other words,
the court felt that "[t]he fall of Harris v. Balk ... did not necessarily topple
"21
Seider.
The O'Connor court heard four interlocutory appeals from four separate
United States District Court cases, 2 the facts of which were essentially the
Id. at 209.
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

1s

"1 579 F.2d at 199.

Ferruzzo v. Bright Trucking Inc., No. 78-7047 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1977); Kotsonis v.
Superior Motor Express, No. 78-7058 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1977); Schwartz v. Boston Hospital
for Women, Nos. 78-7044, 7076 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1977); O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Hereinafter references to O'Connor are to the
Second Circuit opinion unless otherwise specified.
22
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same." In all of these cases the plaintiffs were residents or domiciliaries of
New York;2 the named defendants were residents of foreign states; and the

plaintiffs obtained jurisdiction over the defendants by attaching the defendants' insurance policies, which were held by companies doing business
in the state of New York. The primary problem facing the court in O'Connor
was:
whether Seider v. Roth, sanctioning a procedure for obtaining jurisdic-

tion in a negligence action by a New York resident against a nonresident defendant for wrongful death or personal injury in an out-of-

state accident through attachment of a policy of liability insurance issued
by an insurer doing business in New York, [had] been undermined by
Shafler v. Heitner.... 11
Rather than deciding whether or not Seider had originally been a wise
decision, the Second Circuit in O'Connor chose only to review the case in
light of Shaffer. The court could have decided that Shaffer gave it the excuse
to hold that Seider was no longer applicable. This would have been the easy
26
decision and would have satisfied those who had been critical of Seider.
Instead, the Second Circuit determined whether Seider could withstand the
force of Shaffer. If it could, it would not be overturned simply because of
its unpopularity.
The defendants in O'Connor urged that since Harris v. Balk, a quasi
in rem situation, had been overruled by Shaffer, all such quasi in rem cases
were necessarily overruled." In examining the opinion in Seider v. Roth on
Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1977), involved facts identical
to those in Schwartz v. Boston Hospital for Women, where the New York plaintiff attached
the insurance policy of a nonresident doctor for malpractice that occurred outside of New
York. The New York Supreme Court, Kings County, which found insufficient contacts to
sustain jurisdiction, assumed that Shaffer's effect on Harris invalidated Seider. As evidenced
by the O'Connor opinion, that assumption was incorrect. See text accompanying notes 21
supra & 80 infra.
24 In Ferruzzo, Kotsonis, and O'Connor, the injured parties were residents of New York at
the times the injuries occurred; in Schwartz the plaintiffs were not New York residents at
the time of the injury, but they were New York domiciliaries.
25 579 F.2d at 195. A secondary problem facing this court was a choice of law question
pertaining to the specific facts heard by the district court in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), but that issue is outside the scope of this casenote. At least one commentator suggests that jurisdiction over nominal defendants is
appropriate, but that choice of law should then be restricted so that the substantive law
of the forum will be applied only when there are more substantial contacts with the
forum than are present in insurance attachment cases. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The
End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33, 97-99, 101 (1978).
26 Reese, supra note 16; Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1075 (1968); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the
Interstate Corporation, 67 COLuM. L REv. 550 (1967); Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
23

Based on Insurer's Obligation, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654 (1967); Note, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rev.

58 (1968).
27 579 F.2d at 198. See also R. LEFLAR, AMICAN CoNFLCTS LAw, §§ 24 & 25 (3d ed.
1977).
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which the O'Connor court relied, nowhere was it asserted that the decision
was based on a Harris-type attachment of a debt of one individual to another. Although Harris may have been the "catalyst" which initiated the
possibility of attaching insurance policies and enabled the Seider court to
hold as it did,"5 Seider was found to be valid under the minimum contacts
test as well.
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court observed that "in cases such
as Harris..., the only role played by the property [was] to provide the basis
for bringing the defendant into court."2 Contrast Harris,where the property
attached had no connection to the cause of action, with Seider and O'Connor,
where the property attached was an integral part of what established the connection with the litigation."0 The Seider attachment is one of the insurance
debt owed by the insurer to the insured, as provided by statute."' In spite of
the insurance community's general dislike of the statutes and the insurance
attachment practice in New York,"2 the legislature has not modified the
statutes either by prohibiting attachment of insurance policies as the basis
of jurisdiction or by extending the "judicially created direct action remedy"3 3
to cases other than those like Seider and O'Connor. New York's insurance
law provides that an injured person may sue the insurance company after
first obtaining judgment against the insured.3 ' In other words, New York does
28

Note, 19 B.C.L. REv. 772, 780 (1978).

29 433 U.S. at 209.
5

OFuchsberg, Seider v. Roth: Alive and Well, 12 TWAL

LAW.

Q. 97 (1968)

(counsel for

plaintiffs in O'Connor).
81 See N.Y.Crv. PRAc. LAW §§ 5201, 6202.
Reese, supra note 15.
Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMoRY L.J. 739, 769 n.129 (1977). See also Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie
Too Many or Putting Seider Back Into Its Bottle, 71 COLuM. L. Rv. 660, 686-87 (1971),
32

33

for a direct action statute proposal that served as a guide for legislation that the New
York legislature did pass, but which the late Governor Rockefeller vetoed. Governor's
Veto Message, 1973 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 349.
3
'N.Y. INS. LAw § 167 (McKinney).

(1) No policy or contract insuring against liability for injury to person ... or against
liability for injury to, or destruction of, property shall be issued or delivered in
this state, unless it contains in substance the following provisions which are
equally or more favorable to the insured ....

(b) A provision that in case judgment against the insured . . . shall remain unsatisfied
.. . then an action may . . . be maintained against the insurer under the terms of
the policy or contract for the amount of such judgment not exceeding the amount
of the applicable limit of coverage under such policy or contract ....
Subject to the limitations and conditions of subsection one, paragraph (b), an
action may be maintained by the following persons against the insurer upon any
policy or contract of liability insurance which is governed by said paragraph (b),
to recover the amount of a judgment against the insured ....
(a) A person who . . . has obtained a judgment against the insured . . . for damages
for injury sustained or loss or damage occasioned during the life of the policy
or contract; and
(b) Any person who . . . has obtained a judgment against the insured . . . to en(7)
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not furnish injured persons with general direct actions against all insurers

of tortfeasors. Rather, by judicial construction, Seider and the cases which
followed it stand as authority for a kind of direct action in limited circumstances where a New York resident is injured by an out-of-state tortfeasor
5
who is insured by an insurance company doing business in New York.
An examination of Seider and its progeny" reveals a trend moving away
from the pro-defendant bias3" of earlier courts and towards a Shaffer tripartite test,38 a trend which started even before Shafler became the law of the
land. " The New York state and federal courts had not mechanically been
holding that they had jurisdiction whenever the nominal defendants happened
to be insured by an insurance company doing business within the state. For
example, in Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,"0 the court refused to extend

(c)

force a right of contribution or indemnity, or any person subrogated to the judgment creditor's rights under such judgment; and
Any assignee of a judgment obtained as specified in paragraph (a) or paragraph
(b) of this subsection ....

35 Judicially and statutorily created direct actions against the insurer do not present diversity
of citizenship problems for federal courts where the insurance company is doing business
in the forum state unless the forum state is also the state of the insurance company's incorporation or its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970) provides:
For purposes of this section . . . a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
place of business: Provided further, That in any direct action against the insurer of a
policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be
deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any
State by which the insurer has been incorporated and or the State where it has its
principal place of business.
0.77(2.-l), at 717.400.71 (4.-6), at 701.63-701.64,
See also 1 MooRE's FED. PRAc.
717.43, $ 0.77(4), at 721-721.6 (2d ed. 1974); 13 C. WIHurr, A. MILLER & E. CooPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JuRisDICTION § 3624 at 777-88, § 3629 at 829-35 (1975).
36 Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1972); Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411
F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410
F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 410 F.2d 117, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 844
(1969); Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); Neuman v.
Dunham, 39 N.Y.2d 999, 355 N.E.2d 294, 387 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1967); Simpson v. Loehmann,
21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), motion for reargument denied,
21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968). Judge Friendly wrote the
opinions in Farrell,Minichiello, and Buckley as well as the opinion in O'Connor.

37 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 110 (Judge Friendly quoting Buckley v. New
York Post Corp., 373 F.2d at 181 and vonMehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1128 (1966)); accord, Williams, The Validity
of Assuming Jurisdiction by the Attachment of Automobile Liability Insurance Obligations:
The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner upon Seider v. Roth, 9 Rur.-CAM. LJ. 241, 265 (1977);
Note, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 399 (1978).
38 The tripartite test promoted by Shaffer required contacts among the defendant, the litigation, and the forum state. 433 U.S. at 189, 204 & 207.
39 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
0411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir, 1969), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss2/9

8

Mackus: O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.
Fall, 1978]

RECENT CASES

the Seider type of jurisdiction41 because, in its opinion, the contacts of the
plaintiffs (administrators of out-of-state decedents), with defendants; the
litigation (multiple tort suit on a plane crash that occurred out-of-state);
and the forum state of New York, were so insubstantial that to allow jurisdiction would be unfair. The only real contact with New York in the Farrell
case was that the insurer did business there and that contact was not found
to be strong enough by itself to provide jurisdiction. Where plaintiffs were
not forum state residents, the forum state had no substantial and continuing
interest in the controversy.'" In Farrell, the facts resembled those of Harris
v. Balk to the extent that the only basis for jurisdiction in the forum state was
the debt, " but the Farrell court chose not to apply Harris, even without
benefit of Shaffer. Farrellillustrates that Shaffer's overruling of Harris" was
not such a radical change in the law.' 5 Attachment that surpassed the means
for attaining jurisdiction and became an end in itself was no longer permitted'" but the New York courts did not need Shaffer in order to reach that
conclusion.
When the "classical rule of physical personal service"'" required by
Pennoyer v. Neff"8 to gain in personam jurisdiction was molded into the
International Shoe rule of "minimum contacts" in ight of "fair play and
substantial justice," the extreme flexibility of this new standard for testing in
personam jurisdiction was criticized. 9 In spite of this criticism, the new rule's
reasonableness gave it life, and it proved to be a manageable standard for
the courts to use. Evaluated in light of what is most reasonable, the extension
of what had originally been the test for in personam jurisdiction to in rem
or quasi in rem jurisdiction seems natural, just, and manageable. Shaffer
did for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdictions what InternationalShoe had
done for in personam jurisdiction. Where the latter extended in personan
jurisdiction beyond the mere territorial boundaries of the state, 5' Shaffer provided for an analysis of all contacts with the forum state. No longer would
" See also Varady v. Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Donawitz v. Danek, 42
N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977) (decided ten days before Shaffer
v. Heitner).
42 411 F.2d at 817 (Judge Friendly citing Simpson v. Loehmann).
48See text accompanying note 29 supra.
"433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
45 R. LEFLAR, supra note 27, at § 24A.
48433 U.S. at 209.
47 Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE LJ. 289, 312 (1956).
48 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Ehrenzweig, supra note 47.
80 See generally Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pen49

noyer v. Neff, 43 BRooirYN L. REv. 600 (1977); vonMehren and Trautman, supra note 37.
51
Note, 9 TOL. L. REv. 333. 341-42 (1978).
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such rigid and mechanical rules as the mere presence or absence of property
or obligations 2 with the forum state determine whether or not a case could
be heard there. Instead, contacts necessary for sustaining jurisdiction, without regard to the kind of jurisdiction,5" would be identified as those relating
to the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation. Since these contacts
were not restricted to those between the defendant and the forum state, but
included the contacts of the litigation with forum and defendant, the type
of Seider insurance cases were not affected when Harris was overruled. In
Seider and O'Connor, where the contacts between the forum state and the
nominal defendants might not, by themselves, have been strong enough to
warrant sustaining jurisdiction over the defendants," given those contacts
and the additional element of the litigation," traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice were not violated when the plaintiff sued in his own
state a foreign defendant 1) who was responsible for the injury, 2) who
would not be substantially deprived of anything in case of a holding for
plaintiff, 6 and 3) whose defense in the litigation was really being controlled
by a company regularly and systematically, not temporarily and casually,
doing business in plaintiff's state.5"
Because of the holding in Shafler, courts will not have to fabricate
assigning a situs to an intangible, whether that intangible is characterized as
a debt due the plaintiff or an asset, in the form of an insurance policy, "due"
the nominal defendant.5 This exercise had already been described as objecShaffer v. Heitner did not say that attachments or debts could no longer serve as bases
for jurisdiction; it only said that attachments or debts were not sufficient bases for jurisdiction.
See, e.g., text accompanying note 29 supra.
53 See Judge Dooling's analysis in the O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp. district court opinion,
437 F. Supp. at 1002, quoted by Judge Friendly in the Second Circuit's opinion, 579 F.2d
at 200:
Seider v. Roth and Simpson are sui generis in the field of jurisdiction. They cannot be
pigeon-holed as in rem or in personam. They are in real terms in personam so far as the
insurer is concerned. For the named defendant the suit is only an occasion of cooperation in the defense; his active role is that of witness. It is beside the point to test the
constitutionality of the procedure in terms of the named defendant; his role as a party
is hardly more real than that of the casual ejector Richard Roe in common law
ejectment actions. What is at stake in the suit is the plaintiff's claim for the payment
of his alleged damages by the insurer.
54 At least one commentator suggests that the contacts of the nominal defendant with the
forum state might indeed satisfy the requisite minimum contacts in these cases. See Williams,
supra note 37, at 274-77.
52 Consideration of contacts with the additional element of the litigation is not an extension
of the minimum contacts standard. An attempted extension of the standard was held to
violate due process. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978).
56 O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d at 199.
57 21 N.Y.2d at 311-12, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 672; Thrasher v. United States
Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 167, 225 N.E.2d 503, 507, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (1967).
See also vonMehren & Trautman, supra note 37, at 1167.
58 For a suggestion that the plaintiff might be attaching the nominal defendant's asset rather
than the insurance company's debt, see Note, supra note 51, at 343.
52
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tionable even prior to Shaffer.5" Now the test has become one of deciding,

after weighing all of the circumstances, whether or not a finding of jurisdiction
would be reasonable.6" Jurisdictional requirements of minimum contacts
among the forum, the defendant, and the litigation would help the courts
rid themselves of the legal fiction"' that attaching a debt, obligation, or contract is attaching property62 that has a situs.6 3 In the past, quasi in rem bases
for jurisdiction sometimes had to be found by the courts even where there
were sufficient contacts to warrant in personam jurisdiction."4 Justice Marshall, in Shaffer, stated that asserting jurisdiction over property was actually
asserting jurisdiction over the owner of the property. 5 His opinion affirmed
Chief Judge Fuld's justification in Simpson v. Loehmann for the acknowledgement that to the extent used to gain jurisdiction for New York, the basis for
the Seider holding was really direct action against the insurance company,"
59 Smit, supra note 50, at 622-23. Professor Smit criticizes assigning a situs to an intangible
for two reasons. First, assigning a physical location to something that has no physical
existence is a "fictional exercise," the implication being that the exercise is not recognizing
reality. Second, jurisdiction is no longer based on power, therefore "reification of a debt
owed to defendant is unnecessary." While Smit projected that under the reasonableness
standard Harris would have to be overruled, he correctly made no such assertion regarding
Seider, since Seider, and therefore O'Connor, do meet the standard.
60
lntermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978). See also, Note,
12 AKRON L. Rv. 317 (1978).
61 Ficto, in old Roman law . . . [signified] a false averment on the part of the plaintiff which
the defendant was not allowed to traverse . . . .[Now] the expression "Legal Fiction"
[signifies] any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule has
undergone alteration its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified ....
mhe very conception of a set of principles, invested with a higher sacredness than
those of the original law and demanding application independently of the consent of
any external body, belongs to a much more advanced stage of thought than that to
which legal fictions originally suggested themselves. H. MAINE, ANcmr LAW, 30-31, 33
(1912).
42 For reference to another jurisdictional fiction, implied consent, see Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1916); Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1855); Ehrenzweig, supra note 47, at 310.
The fiction of suing a nominal defendant instead of directly suing the liability insurance
company remains viable to accomplish the purpose of protecting "the insurance company
against overly sympathetic juries." Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d at
167, 225 N.E.2d at 507, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
63 M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 42 (1972).
64
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEx. L. REv. 657, 662 (1959). Chief
Justice Traynor described a California case, Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338,
316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), wherein the court had to find quasi
in rem based jurisdiction in order to hear resident plaintiffs' case against a nonresident
defendant over whom the minimum contacts test of International Shoe would have applied
to establish in personam jurisdiction had such jurisdiction been allowed by statute on the
particular facts.
65433 U.S. at 212. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (1971):
"The phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring
to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing."
-"21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 671-72, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (quoting Seider v. Roth,
17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102). Cf. Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), where a Louisiana "direct action" statute was found
constitutional.
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i.e., an assertion of in personam jurisdiction over the insurance company.
Judge Keating, concurring in Simpson, maintained that Seider and its progeny
represented "a recognition of realities and not fictions." ' One might contend
that if the suit were in reality against the insurer, the requisite contacts between the nominal defendant and the forum would be missing.68 The contact
between the defendant and the forum, taken alone, also might not be sufficient
to support jurisdiction. However, the added contact that the nominal defendant would have with the litigation by virtue of the injury he caused to
a plaintiff who resided within the forum, coupled with the possession of the
insurance policy, would make a sustaining of jurisdiction reasonable and
fair. Although judicially created direct action functions to serve New York's
needs, the state, as a matter of public policy, does not want a direct action
against insurance companies in every local cause of action for fear that juries
might be inclined to return excessive verdicts against insurance corporations."9 Seider and O'Connor are narrow decisions, specifically limited to
insurance cases where the named defendant is an out-of-state tortfeasor who
is insured by a company doing business in New York. Seider was never extended by New York courts to the attachment of corporate stock, as the
plaintiff had attempted to do in Shafler v. Heitner.Marshall's statement, then,
that "continued acceptance [of the fiction that a debt has a situs] would serve
only to allow state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant,""0 must be modified by the argument that where fair play has not
been violated, subjecting the defendant to the jurisdiction of the state court
should be allowed if his other contacts with the litigation and the state are
substantial.
In the interest of fairness, courts must allow the nominal defendant to
make a limited appearance"' in order to limit the defendant's liability to the
amount of the insurance policy. 2 Before Shaffer, when quasi in rem actions
were distinguished from in personam actions, the limited appearance was not
needed in attachment cases if the attachment statute limited defendant's
liability to the value of the property attached. Jurisdiction over property or
67

21 N.Y.2d at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640.

e58J. MAR&r,

CONFLICT op LAws 559 (1978).

Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 123-27, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524, 530-33
(1955); Appleman, Joinder of Policyholder and Insurer as PartiesDefendant, 22 MARQ. L
Rnv. 75, 81 (1938); Note, 74 HARv. L. REV. 357, 358 (1960); Note, 41 MN,.
L. REv.
784, 788 (1957).
TO
433 U.S. at 212.
71 See Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 17-18, 112 N.E. 500, 502 (1916) (quoting Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 468 (1813)). See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIvIL
PROCEDURE § 12.23 (2d ed. 1977).
72 The limited appearance would accomplish the same purpose as pre-Shaffer quasi in rem
jurisdiction, that is, the nominal defendant would be bound only to the extent of the value
of the res, i.e., the insurance policy. Note, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1412, 1416 (1969).
89
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obligations did not confer power over the person. Any judgment was limited
to the value of the property or obligation.' However, in post-Shaffer situations, the nominal defendant's liability in cases where the defendant's insurance policy is attached must be limited to the face value of the insurance
policy; any liability beyond this value would violate the minimum contacts
standard. In these situations, the nominal defendant would have availed
himself of the protection of the forum court only to the extent of the insurance policy. Contacts in a Seider/O'Connor type of action among the defendant, forum and litigation would not support a general appearance. The
defendant's contacts with the litigation would be less than the requisite minimum contacts if the defendant were forced to appear without benefit of the
aid of the insurer."
O'Connor is the most authoritative answer for questions of jurisdiction
in insurance attachment cases such as Seider. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins"'
requires that federal courts hearing diversity suits apply state substantive
law.'0 At the time that O'Connor was decided by the Second Circuit, the
New York Court of Appeals had not yet decided whether the Seider doctrine
was still good law, even though a conflict was apparent in lower state courts
on this issue." In October, 1978, the court of appeals held in Baden v.
8
Staples7
that because the Seider rule "[did] not appear to have worked extensive injustice, '""h there were no "'cogent reasons' ... to abandon [the
The court of appeals' continued endorsement of
Seider] precedent....
Seider was less than enthusiastic, but it explicitly refused to overrule the case,
stating that if the rule was to be changed, it would have to be changed by the
legislature."'
In another recent case, Savchuck v. Rush,"' the Minnesota Supreme
Is Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L.
REv. 107, 109 (1913).
7, For an opinion that post-Shaffer limited appearance "is now an obsolete vestige of a
discredited form of jurisdiction," see Note, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 323, 337-40 (1978).
75 304 U.S. 817 (1938).
78 ld. at 822.
7 Cases supporting the Seider doctrine included Alford v. McGaw, 61 App. Div. 2d 504,
507-09, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501-02 (Sup. Ct. 1978), appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 776 (Ct.
App. 1978); Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1978). Cases
rejecting the Seider doctrine included Attanasio v. Ferre, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Katz
v. Umansky, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648,
398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
7845 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978).
'Id. at 890, 383 N.E.2d at 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
8
o d. at 891, 383 N.E.2d at 112, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
81 Id. at 890, 383 N.E.2d at 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
82
Minn. _,
245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Rush v. SayMinn.
chuck, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), aff'd on rehearingsub. nom. Savchuck v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1978).
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Court had initially affirmed a garnishment of an insurer's obligation to the
defendant insured, having based its decision on a state statute 3 and Seider,
citing "[b]asic considerations of fairness" as underlying their decision." The
United States Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case
to Minnesota for rehearing in light of Shaffer.5 By remanding the case, the
Supreme Court had refused an opportunity to expressly overrule Seider. On
rehearing, the Minnesota court distinguished Savchuck from Harris v. Balk
and Shaffer v. Heitner by construing the Minnesota statute as being "consistent with the standards established in InternationalShoe v. Washington.""6
Minnesota's decision bears out a prediction that "state courts [would] interpret their statutes to comply with a minimum contacts analysis so as to
give effect to the legislative intent to allow personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants." ' The decision also illustrated that Shaffer v. Heitner
may not have had as astounding an impact as was initially believed.
Not all courts will follow O'Connor'sinterpretation of Shaffer v. Heitner;
not all courts have followed Seider.8 The O'Connor case has little relevance
to Ohio law because Ohio has never endorsed the Seider line of reasoning
regarding attachment of insurance debts as a method of acquiring jurisdiction
over the tortious defendant. Nor does Ohio grant direct action against in-

83 MwN.STAT.

§ 571.41 subd. 2(b)(2)(b) (1976):

84

Subd. 2. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, a plaintiff in
any action in a court of record for the recovery of money may issue a garnishee
summons before judgment therein in the following instances only . . .
(b) If the court shall order the issuance of such summons, if a summons and complaint
is filed with the appropriate court and either served on the defendant or delivered to
a sheriff for service on the defendant not more than 30 days after the order is signed,
and if, upon application to the court it shall appear that . . .
(2) The purpose of the garnishment is to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction and that...
(b) defendant is a nonresident individual, or a foreign corporation, partnership or
association ....
245 N.W.2d at 629.

85

433 U.S. 902.

86 272 N.W.2d at 889.
87 Note, 11 AKRON L. REv. 333, 342 (1977).
88

See, e.g., Robinson v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970); Ricker v.
Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970); Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d
728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976); Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 1972);
Missouri ex rel. G.E.I.C.O. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Rocca v.
Kenney, 381 A.2d 330 (N.H. 1977); Hart v. Cote, 145 NJ. Super. 420, 367 A.2d 1219
(1976); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972); Jordine
v. Donnelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198 A.2d 513 (1964); DeRentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258
A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970); Hously v.
Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967); Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d
360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974) (dictum). See generally Carpenter, New York's Expanding Empire
in Tort Jurisdiction: Quo Vadis?, 22 HAsTIos LJ. 1173 (1971); Note, 14 CAL. W.L. REv.
204 (1978).
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surance companies. The Ohio insurance statute89 provides that the injured
party may move against the insurer for satisfaction on a judgment already
obtained against the defendant insured. There is no direct action against the
insurance company until a judgment has already been rendered for the plaintiff. In Chitlik v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"° the injured out-of-state plaintiff
attempted to recover compensation for personal injuries directly from the
insurance company on the theory that he was the third party beneficiary of
the contract between the Ohio tortfeasor and the insurer.9 ' However, the
court of appeals for Cuyahoga County maintained that even though liability
had already been established in a settlement of property damage claims, the
out-of-state plaintiff still had to sue the insured Ohio tortfeasor and obtain
judgment before proceeding against the insurer.92 Although there may be
some indication that Ohio courts might be moving toward allowing direct
action suits in certain limited instances, 3 there is no indication that Ohio's
strong policy against "prejudicial or harmful effect against the insurer" will
undergo significant change in personal injury actions. ' If Ohio refuses to
extend legislative or judicial direct action to out-of-state residents suing insurance companies in Ohio as in Chitlik, it is inconceivable that an Ohio
resident would be able to rely on any kind of attachment of an insurance
debt to reach an out-of-state defendant as in O'Connor.For courts in New
York, Minnesota, and other states that would choose to continue the Seider
v. Roth tradition, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp. is ample precedent for
doing so. Due process of law still protects defendants in that judgments for
plaintiffs in Seider/O'Connor situations "will not deprive a defendant of
anything substantial that would have been otherwise useful to him."9 "
ELOISE LUBBINGE MACKUS

so Oko REv. CODE ANN. § 3929.06 (Page 1976):
Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any firm, person, or corporation by any
person . . . for loss or damage on account of bodily injury or death . . . or for loss
or damage . . . on account of [other causes], if the defendant in such action was
insured against loss or damage at the time when the rights of action arose, the judgment
creditor . . . to reach and apply the insurance money to the satisfaction of the judgment, may file a supplemental petition in the action in which said judgment was
rendered, in which the insurer is made [a] new party defendant in said action ....
Thereafter the action shall proceed as to the insurer as in an original action.
90 34 Ohio App. 2d 193, 299 N.E.2d 295 (1973).
91 Id. at 194-95, 299 N.E.2d at 296.
92 Id. at 198, 299 N.E.2d at 298.
93 Browne, The Demise of Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device for Testing the Insurer's
Duty to Defend, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 423, 433-35 (1974) (citing Heuser v. Crum, 31 Ohio
St. 2d 90, 285 N.E.2d 340 (1972)).
94

34 Ohio App. 2d at 197-98, 299 N.E.2d at 298.

95 O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d at 199.
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